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Looking	Back,	Looking	Forward:	Feminist	Legal	Scholarship	in	SLS		
	
	Abstract:		This	article	offers	a	review	of	shifts	in	feminist	legal	theory	since	the	early	1990s.	We	first	use	our	respective	histories	and	fields	of	expertise	to	provide	a	brief	overview	and	highlight	some	key	themes	within	feminist	legal	theory.	We	then	examine	Social	&	Legal	Studies,	asking	whether	it	has	met	its	key	goal	of	integrating	feminist	analyses	at	every	level.		Our	review	suggests	that	SLS	has	offered	many	important	contributions	to	feminist	legal	scholarship	but	has	not	fulfilled	its	lofty	goal	of	integrating	feminist	analyses	at	every	level	of	scholarship.	It	features	feminist	work	quite	consistently	and	some	degree	of	mainstreaming	is	evident,	as	is	the	international	reach	of	SLS.	Too	many	articles	fail,	however,	to	incorporate	or	even	mention	feminist	approaches.	We	end	with	thoughts	about,	and	hopes	for,	the	future	of	legal	feminism,	examining	efforts	to	revitalize	the	field	and	suggesting	possible	directions	for	the	future.		Keywords:	Feminist	Legal	Studies,	Law	and	Gender,	Feminist	Legal	Theory,	the	State,	Materialist	Feminism		
Social	&	Legal	Studies	has	four	main	aims	[including]	…	the	integration	of	feminist	analyses	at	every	level	of	scholarship.		With	these	words	the	editors	of	Social	&	Legal	Studies	(SLS)	signaled	a	major	commitment	to	feminist	scholarship	in	their	first	Editorial	(1992:	5).	There	was	no	shortage	of	feminist	scholars	to	provide	content	when	the	journal	was	born	in	1992.	The	number	of	women	in	legal	academia	and	related	fields	began	to	increase	during	the	1980s	and,	especially,	the	1990s.	Feminist	literature	grew	exponentially,	even	if	it	took	some	time	for	women	to	achieve	numeric	equality.	Not	all	women	law	professors	held	feminist	worldviews	and	then,	as	now,	some	who	did	published	in	fields	often	not	assumed	to	be	directly	relevant	to	feminist	legal	theory	(e.g.	Sarra	2013).	Nevertheless,	the	entry	of	feminists	into	academia	had	a	significant	impact	on	legal	scholarship	(Bartlett	2012,	383-386;	Davies	2007:	651)1	and	some	male	legal	scholars	also	published	work	that	was	influenced	by	feminist	perspectives.			Feminist	legal	theory	has	as	its	focus	women	and	law,	but	in	recent	decades,	much	feminist	scholarship	has	problematized	both	concepts	(Painter	2015).	Feminist	scholars	working	in	law	schools,	as	well	as	in	sociology,	philosophy,	criminology	and	other	disciplines	have	drawn	on	a	variety	of	theoretical	sources	and	developed	the	field	in	ways	that	have	influenced	law	reform	and	litigation,	while	also	critiquing	some	of	those	reform	efforts,	narratives	of	progress,	and	strategies	for	achieving	equality	and	liberation.	Many	feminist	legal	scholars	continue	to	draw	on	studies	outside	law	(Davies	2007:	651),	and	some	have	home	disciplines	other	than	law,	as	is	evident	in	SLS	(e.g.	Ahmed	1993,	Smart	1992).			This	article	offers	a	review	of	shifts	in	feminist	legal	theory	since	the	early	1990s.	Because	we	represent	different	generations	of	feminist	legal	scholars,	we	first	use	our	respective	
                                                1	By	1993,	28%	of	Canadian	law	professors	were	women	(Canadian	Bar	Association	1993,	49)	in	contrast	to	only	12%	in	1971-72	(Bich	1992,	58).	In	many	law	faculties,	women	now	constitute	50%	of	academic	staff.	
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histories	and	fields	of	expertise	to	provide	a	brief	overview	and	highlight	some	key	themes	within	feminist	legal	theory.	We	then	examine	SLS	itself,	asking	whether	it	has	met	its	key	goal	of	integrating	feminist	analyses	at	every	level.		We	end	with	thoughts	about,	and	hopes	for,	the	future	of	legal	feminism.		
Situating	ourselves	and	the	field		Our	histories	in	legal	academia	began	during	different	periods	in	the	trajectory	of	feminist	legal	theory.	Susan	was	a	junior	academic	in	the	mid	1980s	when	feminist	law	professors	were	a	minority,	but	interest	in	applying	feminist	theory	to	law	accelerated.	Even	then,	scepticism	arose	about	the	extent	to	which	law	or	legal	rights	alone	can	provide	remedies	for	inequality.	Reflecting	a	heightened	appreciation	of	the	complex	factors	at	work	in	sustaining	inequality,	many	feminist	interventions	moved	away	from	formal	legal	equality	towards	approaches	that	take	structural	impediments	seriously.	This	work	accepted	the	challenges	of	feminists	who	pointed	to	the	limits	of	formal	equality	in	achieving	meaningful	change	(e.g.	Lawrence	2006)	due	to	its	elision	of	substantive	inequalities.	In	countries	such	as	Canada	with	constitutional	equality	guarantees,	considerable	time	has	been	devoted	to	considering	which	theories	of	equality	might	best	provide	remedies	for	systemic	inequalities	and	which	fields	of	law	might	most	usefully	be	challenged	to	promote	equality.	This	is	not	to	say	that	scholarship	focused	on	equality	was	the	only	approach,	even	in	the	earlier	days.		Indeed	categorizing	the	different	approaches	within	the	proliferating	feminist	literature	on	law	was	in	vogue	in	the	1980s.	In	her	early	bibliographical	work	with	Elizabeth	Sheehy,	Susan	used	the	then	dominant	theoretical	categories	such	as	liberal,	radical,	and	socialist	feminism	(Sheehy	and	Boyd	1989:	1-2;	Boyd	and	Sheehy	1986).	Only	a	decade	later,	in	a	second	annotated	bibliography,	these	categories	no	longer	resonated	(Bouchard,	Boyd	and	Sheehy	1999).	Entries	related	to	Black,	lesbian,	aboriginal,	and	disabled	women	had	multiplied,	reflecting,	inter	alia,	the	increased	numbers	of	such	voices	in	law	and	academia	as	well	as	important	litigation	on	questions	such	as	equality	and	sexual	orientation;	equality	and	disability.	The	rise	of	postmodernism	and	the	deconstruction	of	universalizing	concepts	such	as	‘patriarchy’	also	played	a	role	in	diverting	feminist	attention	away	from	a	focus	on	any	unitary	notion	of	‘woman’	as	a	subject.	Concepts	of	power	were	rendered	more	complicated,	challenging	the	radical	feminist	association	of	oppression	with	male-identified	culture,	law,	and	state	(Davies	657-658).	As	Belcher	(2000:	539)	puts	it,	the	feminist	debate	shifted	‘away	from	the	emphasis	on	how	women	differ	from	men	and	toward	acknowledgement	of	differences	among	women’.		Anticipating	the	rise	of	theories	of	intersectionality,	Sheehy	and	Boyd	highlighted	the	‘dialectical	development	of	feminist	perspectives	on	law	which	helps	us	to	understand	and	combat	the	complex	social	construction	of	women’s	oppression	and	must	involve	constant	attention	to	the	interplay	of	gender,	race,	class	and	other	factors	shaping	power	relations	and	domination’	(1989:	3).2	By	the	time	of	their	1999	bibliography,	the	title	of	‘Intersecting	Oppressions’	was	used	as	an	overarching	framework	for	several	categories	of	identity	and	oppression	(Bouchard,	Boyd	and	Sheehy	1999).3		
                                                2	Works	from	a	class	perspective,	inspired	by	Marxist	or	socialist	feminism,	number	fewer	than	those	in	the	other	categories,	despite	frequent	calls	to	attend	to	race,	class	and	gender.	3	The	actual	categories	were:	Anti-Semitism,	Class/Poverty,	Disability,	Elderly	Women,	Lesbianism,	and	Racism.	Works	in	these	sections	dealt	with	the	intersection	of	gender	and	at	least	one	other	factor	that	contributes	to	oppression.		
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	The	trajectory	of	Susan’s	family	law	work	illustrates	another	trend:	the	waning	influence	of	‘materialist’	approaches	to	law.	Whereas	her	earlier	work	in	the	family	law	field	drew	heavily	on	socialist	feminist	critiques	of	how	marriage,	the	nuclear	family	form,	familial	ideology,	and	the	sexual	division	of	labour	related	to	women’s	oppression	within	capitalism,	her	later	work	rarely	referred	explicitly	to	this	‘second	wave’	literature	(for	a	critique	and	call	for	a	more	materialist	feminist	approach,	see	Boyd	1999).	Nevertheless,	critical	analysis	of	the	consequences	of	(re)privatizing	economic	and	caregiving	responsibilities	within	the	family	under	neo-liberalism,	which	creates	particularly	onerous	responsibilities	for	women,	features	in	her	later	work	(e.g.	Boyd	2010,	2013).	As	we	discuss	later,	interest	in	materialist	feminist	approaches	to	law	has	resurfaced.		Debra	entered	law	school	at	a	time	when	many	of	the	above-mentioned	shifts,	notably	away	from	‘grand	theories’	and	towards	intersectional	approaches	to	oppression,	were	occurring.	As	such,	her	career	mirrors	the	time	frame	that	this	article	addresses	and,	largely,	the	period	during	which	SLS	has	existed.	Her	research	engages	with	criminal	law	and	punishment	practices,	particularly	incarceration	and	experiences	of	women	as	accused	persons	and	prisoners.	Beginning	in	her	student	days,	Debra	has	been	involved	in	feminist	legal	advocacy	and	prisoner	rights	organizations,	and	that	community	engagement	informs	her	scholarly	work.		In	the	years	since	Debra	began	her	academic	career	in	2001,	the	global	population	of	women	in	prison	has	grown	rapidly,	increasing	at	a	substantially	higher	rate	than	the	men’s	prison	population.4			Feminist	and	other	critical	criminological	approaches	influenced	law	and	society	scholarship	in	the	1990s	and	2000s,	as	feminists	brought	intersectional	and	Foucauldian	analyses	of	power	to	bear	on	the	criminalization	of	women	and	girls	(Hannah-Moffatt	2001,	Naffine	1997)	and	connected	aspects	of	women’s	criminalization	to	features	of	the	neo-liberal	state	(Balfour	&	Comack	2014,	Snider	2003).	Also	during	this	time,	feminists	have	increasingly	attended	to	the	role	of	state	violence	in	criminalizing	racialized	and	poor	populations,	including	Indigenous	and	racialized	women,	illustrating	the	difficulty	of	understanding	these	fields	without	employing	an	approach	that	is	attentive	to	the	intersections	of	gender,	race,	Indigeneity,	and	class.		Since	at	least	the	1990s,	feminist	scholars	have	turned	a	critical	eye	on	the	extent	to	which	feminist-inspired	law	reforms	to	address	violence	against	women	have	been	absorbed	or	co-opted	by	punitive	agendas	and	contributed	to	increasingly	criminalized	societies	(Snider	1994,	Bumiller	2008).	Some	feminists,	including	Debra,	have	developed	anti-carceral	feminist	analyses	following	these	insights	(Davis	2003,	Monture	2006,	Baldry,	Carlton	&	Cuneen	2015,	Parkes	2016).	As	described	by	Carlton,	anti-carceral	feminism	is	a	unique	voice	within	the	prison	abolitionist	movement,	one	“grounded	in	intersectional	feminist	critiques,	strategies,	and	actions	driven	to	struggle	against	and	undermine	structures	of	oppression	that	give	rise	to	violence	and	injustice”	(2016:	3),	engaging	strategically	with	reform	efforts	in	pursuit	of	decarceration	and	structural	change.		In	the	next	section,	we	use	our	fields	of	expertise	(especially	criminal	law,	family	law,	and	sexuality	and	law)	to	illustrate	some	key	themes	in	feminist	legal	theory.	There	are	many	substantive	themes	in	the	literature	such	as	sexual	and	gender-based	violence,	work	and	income	inequality,	and	inequality	in	the	legal	profession,	to	name	just	a	few.	Our	focus	is	on	
                                                4	It	is	estimated	that	the	overall	world	prison	population	increased	by	around	20%	from	2000-2015.	However,	at	the	same	time	there	was	a	50%	increase	in	the	number	of	imprisoned	women	and	girls	(Walmsley	2015).	
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the	themes	of	strategic	engagement;	women	versus	gender;	and	choice	and	constraint,	which	we	view	as	cutting	across	subject	areas	and	significant	in	understanding	the	trajectory	of	feminist	legal	scholarship	in	recent	decades.		
Key	Themes	in	Feminist	Legal	Theory		
Strategic	Engagement		Feminist	legal	theory	has	always	been	informed	by,	and	grounded	in,	the	need	to	engage	strategically	with	law	to	improve	social	conditions	for	women.	Praxis	remains	a	strong	element	of	feminist	legal	theory,	reflecting	strategic	feminist	involvement	and	scholarly	engagement	with	law	reform	and	litigation.	What	has	shifted	are	the	dominant	approaches	that	influence	the	field.		Since	the	1980s,	an	appreciation	of	the	complexity	of	inequality	and	the	intersecting	nature	of	oppressions	has	informed	the	trend	away	from	universalizing	theories	focused	on	gender	and	law	or	‘the	state’.	It	is	our	impression	that	less	publication	space	has	been	devoted	to	works	exploring	the	more	abstract	questions	about	feminist	legal	theory	per	se	than	was	true	in	the	1980s	and,	to	some	extent,	in	the	1990s,	as	grand	theories	about	the	sources	of,	and	remedies	for,	women’s	oppression	were	challenged	and	dismantled.	Nevertheless,	the	insights	of	feminist	legal	theory	remain	highly	relevant	to	such	endeavours,	even	if	less	space	may	be	devoted	to	overarching	questions	such	as	the	material	sources	of	inequality.			Criminal	law,	particularly	in	the	area	of	sexual	and	other	gender-based	violence,	has	been	a	significant	site	of	feminist	legal	scholarship,	both	informing	and	critiquing	reform	efforts.	Reforming	the	law	of	sexual	assault	in	some	jurisdictions,	including	Canada,	involved	eliminating	immunity	for	marital	rape,	a	terminological	change	from	rape	to	the	gender	neutral	sexual	assault,	the	adoption	of	an	affirmative	standard	of	consent,	and	a	rape	shield	provision	limiting	access	to	a	complainant’s	sexual	history.	Feminists	also	advocated	for	changes	in	police	and	prosecutorial	practices	around	intimate	partner	violence,	as	well	as	new	sentencing	provisions	meant	to	take	domestic	violence	seriously.	They	then	watched	as	some	of	these	reforms,	such	as	the	rape-shield	law	and	restrictions	on	access	to	complainants’	private	records	(Gotell	2001),	were	rolled	back	by	courts.	Many	problems	that	women	have	long	confronted	in	fields	such	as	sexual	assault	law	are	ongoing	(Larcombe	2016;	Craig	2016)	and	are	exacerbated	for	particular	groups	such	as	Indigenous	women	(Cossins	2003),	asylum	seekers	(Baillot,	Cowan	&	Munro	2012),	and	women	with	disabilities	(Benedet	&	Grant	2007).	Other	reforms	had	unintended	consequences	such	as	the	increased	criminalization	of	women,	especially	racialized	and	Indigenous	women,	who	were	charged	along	with,	or	instead	of,	their	violent	male	partners	(Martin	1998,	Majury	2002).	How	wartime	rape	is	dealt	with	in	international	criminal	law	also	has	taken	up	considerable	feminist	attention	(e.g.	Buss	2009).	Feminist	scholars	–	particularly	Black	and	other	racialized	scholars	–	also	began	to	question	the	impact	of	criminalization	and	mass	incarceration	of	racialized	men	on	communities	(Harris	2011).		The	radical	or	dominance	feminism	of	the	1980s	and	1990s	provided	the	primary	conceptual	framework	informing	the	earlier	reform	efforts,	with	its	insights	about	power,	male	privilege,	and	the	way	rape	law	has	been	written	from	a	male	point	of	view	(MacKinnon	1983;	McIntyre	et	al	2000).	This	analysis	had	thoroughly	discredited	the	myth	of	law’s	neutrality	and	provided	a	language	for	law	reform	to	address	violence	against	women	through	criminal	law.	However,	by	the	1990s,	the	turn	to	postmodern	theory,	notably	the	work	of	Michel	Foucault	
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and	Judith	Butler,	provided	an	alternative	to	dominance	feminism’s	totalizing	view	of	power	and	oppression,	and	complicated	understandings	of	power,	victimization,	agency,	and	identity	in	producing	inequality	in	and	through	law.	Some	feminist	legal	scholars	also	asked	questions	about	the	pervasive	conceptualization	of	sex	as	a	site	of	danger	to	women	and	called,	for	example,	for	more	theorizing	of	‘yes’	to	sex	(Franke	2001;	Kapur	1999).		Due	to	these	differing	approaches,	criminal	law	has	been	a	site	of	significant	disagreements	among	feminists,	and	the	criminal	prohibition	of	prostitution/sex	work	is	a	prime	example	of	these	tensions	at	play.	Feminist	scholarship	on	this	issue	reveals	familiar	differences	between	the	radical	feminist	focus	on	the	oppression	of	women	and	the	sex-positive	feminist	attention	to	the	harms	of	criminalization	in	these	fields,	informed	by	post-structuralism	and	gender	theory	(Munro	&	Della	Giusta	2008;	Bouclin	2012).	Much	of	the	recent	feminist	work	that	addresses	these	issues,	including	that	found	in	SLS,	adheres	to	a	decriminalization	approach	that	now	dominates.	Nevertheless,	strong	feminist	voices	still	argue	that	prostitution	is	a	practice	of	sex	inequality	that	is	inherently	degrading	to	women	and	girls	(Benedet	2008).	Some	of	this	feminist	scholarship	brings	diverse	methodological	and	theoretical	tools,	such	as	ethnography	and	political	economy,	to	bear	in	complicating	the	narratives	of	both	abolitionists	and	sex	work	decriminalization	advocates	about	the	relationships	between	criminal	law	and	sex	markets	(Kotiswaran	2008).				Feminist	legal	scholars	have	also	highlighted	the	risks	of	engaging	with	the	state’s	punishment	apparatus	in	seeking	to	end	violence	against	women,	particularly	in	a	neo-liberal	political	environment	that	can	mediate	any	positive	impact	and	where	punishment	is	not	evenly	distributed	across	racial	and	class	lines.	While	surveillance	and	incarceration	grow,	the	state	retreats	from	its	redistributive,	socio-economic	responsibilities	to	provide	real	safety	and	empowerment	(Munro	2013,	242).	Indigenous	feminists	have	called	attention	to	the	role	of	state	violence	and	colonialism	in	facilitating	the	current	hyper-criminalization	and	incarceration	of	Indigenous	women	and	caution	against	‘gender	responsive’	prison	reform	efforts	(Monture	2006).	The	need	to	improve	laws	related	to	economic	and	social	supports,	such	as	social	assistance,	is	highlighted	by	many	who	are	concerned	about	criminalization	(Cruz	2013;	Balfour	&	Comack	2014).		
Women	or	Gender?		Another	notable	trend	is	to	focus	less	on	the	category	of	‘women’	and	more	on	gender	oppression,	and	its	intersection	with	other	axes	of	oppression	such	as	race,	class,	and	disability.	This	trend	stems	from	a	desire	to	look	at	inequality	more	broadly	and	from	the	influence	of	critical	theorizing	including	critical	race	and	intersectionality,	postmodernism,	and	queer	theory.	In	describing	law	as	gendered,	second	wave	feminists	meant	that	it	was	male-oriented	(Cowan	2013,	106)	or	organized	around	traits	and	experiences	associated	with	masculinity,	thereby	normalizing	the	power	and	dominance	of	men	over	women	in	a	range	of	ways.	With	postmodern	and	queer	theory	came	a	different	understanding	of	gender	and	sex	in	much	feminist	theorizing.	Significantly,	Judith	Butler	understood	gender	as	performative,	generative,	‘always	doing’,	and	sex	as	therefore	produced	by	gender	(Butler	1990).	Queer	theory	and	attention	to	the	experiences	of	transgender	and	intersex	people	fundamentally	challenged	the	binary	categories	of	male/female	and	man/woman,	positing	instead	a	multiplicity	of	genders,	sexes,	and	sexualities.			Sparked	by	these	developments	in	feminist	theory	and	scholarship,	many	university	departments	formerly	called	Women’s	Studies	became	Women	&	Gender	Studies	or	simply	
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Gender	Studies.	So,	too,	law	school	courses	called	Women	and	the	Law	often	gave	way	to	courses	on	Gender	and	Law	or	Gender,	Sexuality	and	Law.	These	courses	generally	remain	feminist	in	orientation	and	include	significant	attention	to	discrimination,	inequality	and	violence	experienced	by	diverse	groups	of	women,	while	also	broadening	their	focus	to	topics	such	as	gender	identity,	masculinities,	and	sexuality	in	law.				Feminist	legal	scholars	similarly	widened	the	scope	of	their	inquiries.		In	Canada,	a	human	rights	complaint	concerning	a	transwoman	who	tried	to	volunteer	as	a	peer	rape	counsellor	for	a	rape	relief	shelter	generated	numerous	articles	considering	the	implications	for	‘women	only	space’	and	the	very	definition	of	‘woman’	(e.g.	Gotell	2011;	Mathen	2004).	Such	shifts	away	from	focusing	on	women’s	specificity	raise	important	and	difficult	questions	about	the	extent	to	which	the	category	‘woman’	has	meaning	and	the	extent	to	which	law	should	rely	on	definitions	of	woman	and	man/male	and	female.	In	addition,	the	need	to	include	in	feminist	legal	theorizing	the	experience	of	intersex,	trans	and	other	queer	voices	and	insights	from	queer	theory	has	involved	important	and	necessary	‘uncomfortable	conversations’	(Fineman,	London	&	Romero	2009).	Many	feminist	legal	scholars	would	agree	with	Ann	Scales	(2009)	that	the	supposed	‘debilitating	contradiction’	between	feminism	and	queer	theory	is	more	apparent	than	real.			Nonetheless,	some	suggest	that	as	analysis	has	moved	into	fields	further	away	from	gender,	including	sexual	orientation,	the	distinctiveness	of	feminist	legal	theory	has	been	diminished	(Bartlett	2012:	427)	or	is	possibly	not	relevant	(Halley	2008).	Catharine	MacKinnon	cautions	that	feminists	are	at	risk	of	losing	‘meaningful	delivery	on	civil	and	human	rights	for	women’	(2009-2010:	177).	Others	suggest	that	the	strategy	of	moving	away	from	legal	language	focused	on	women	is	important	for	feminism.	One	familiar	argument	is	that	a	focus	on	women,	or	women’s	difference	from	men,	risks	defining	women	in	a	protectionist	manner	and	over-emphasizing	their	vulnerability.	Another	is	that	important	possibilities	are	opened	by	using	the	language	of	‘gender’	and	that	feminism	will	be	strengthened,	not	weakened	as	a	result.	For	example,	Otto	urges	that	‘embracing	sex/gender	as	a	fully	social	category	does	not	mean	forsaking	feminism’s	long-standing	commitment	to	addressing	women’s	disadvantage’	(Otto	2013,	198).			Some	shifts	away	from	woman	specific	language	in	legislation	have	arisen	from	practical	or	semantic	difficulties.	In	fields	such	as	family	law	that	rest	on	legal	recognition	of	‘spouses’	to	distribute	or	remove	benefits,	it	is	difficult,	for	example,	to	recognize	specifically	female	disadvantage	whilst	also	recognizing	same	sex	relationships.	As	a	result,	many	laws	on	spousal	rights	and	responsibilities	have	adopted	gender	neutral	definitions	of	‘spouse’,	not	due	to	feminist	concerns	about	reinforcing	women’s	dependency	on	men,	but	rather	to	recognize	non-heterosexual	relationships.	Only	rarely	do	feminist	legal	scholars	suggest	that	a	way	to	exit	the	eternal	debate	about	whether	or	not	to	acknowledge	gender	based	differences	in	law	is	to	argue	for	enhanced	collective	responsibility	for	economic	wellbeing	and	caregiving	rather	than	privatized	remedies	that	rely	on	spousal	relationships.	Although	these	voices	certainly	exist	and	may	be	on	the	rise	(e.g.	Eichner	2016),	it	is	difficult,	especially	in	litigation	scenarios,	to	make	such	arguments	(Boyd	1999:	379-382).	
	
Choice	and	Constraint		Feminist	legal	scholars	have	subjected	key	liberal	concepts	such	as	choice	and	autonomy	to	critical	analysis,	suggesting	that	few	choices	are	unconstrained	by	the	material	and	ideological	conditions	surrounding	them.	For	example,	marriage,	a	quintessential	contract	that	influences	
	 7	 Accepted	Version	
the	lives	of	so	many	women,	has	rarely	been	a	free	choice	for	women,	even	putting	aside	the	fraught	question	of	‘forced	marriage’	(Bunting,	Lawrence	&	Roberts	2016).		The	choice	to	marry	‘has	been	constrained	by	class,	religion,	race,	nationality,	family	and	social	pressure,	ideas	of	morality	and	respectability,	and,	above	all,	financial	considerations’	(Auchmuty	2013:	298).		Much	recent	feminist	legal	scholarship	argues	for	nuanced,	contextual,	and	gendered	understandings	of	choice.	For	example,	in	considering	women	in	polygamy,	sex	work,	and	surrogacy,	Campbell	suggests	that	‘women	exercise	resilience,	resistance	and	agency,	and	make	reasoned	and	deliberate	choices,	even	when	they	live	and	work	within	oppressive	patriarchal	contexts’	while	maintaining	that	‘the	mere	fact	of	recognizing	women’s	ability	to	make	choices	in	the	face	of	imposing	constraints	must	not	serve	to	justify	the	state’s	abdication	of	responsibility	for	addressing	gender-based	discrimination’	(Campbell	2013,	2).		Empirical	feminist	inquiry	and	studies	such	as	Campbell’s	that	allow	women	to	speak	to	their	lived	experiences	(for	example,	in	surrogacy,	sex	work,	drug	use,	incarceration,	etc.)	can	complicate	feminist	analyses	of	victimhood	and	agency	(Campbell	2013;	Busby	&	Vun	2010;	Gregory	2010;	Carlton	&	Segrave	2010).		Feminists	have	also	complicated	liberal	individualist	approaches	by	emphasizing	that	‘autonomy	requires	constructive	relationship	through	a	person’s	life’	(Nedelsky	2011:	39),	suggesting	that	‘relational	autonomy’	is	more	apt.	For	example,	the	care	relationship	between	mothers	and	children	precisely	enables	children	to	aspire	towards	autonomy,	whilst	simultaneously	constraining	that	of	their	mothers.		Moreover,	care	relationships	remain	deeply	gendered.	As	Young	(1990)	has	suggested,	women’s	‘pregnant	embodiment’	–	that	is,	their	more	continuous	physical	experience	in	relation	to	children	due	to	pregnancy,	breastfeeding,	and	care	responsibility	–	prevents	them	from	being	able	to	opt	in	and	out	of	involvement	with	children	in	the	same	way	that	men	can	choose	to	do	(but	see	Karaian	2013).	Women’s	autonomy	is	thus	arguably	an	even	more	unattainable	goal	than	men’s,	subject	perhaps	to	the	possibility	of	transgressive	caregiving	(Kessler	2005).	Indeed	some	feminists	suggest	that	autonomy	is	a	myth	(Fineman	2005).		That	choices	remain	constrained	even	as	women	exercise	agency	is	illustrated	by	a	study	of	the	extent	to	which	motherhood	can	be	meaningfully	autonomous	even	in	an	era	that	offers	more	reproductive	choice	and	fewer	moral	constraints	concerning	single	motherhood	(Boyd,	Chunn,	Kelly	&	Wiegers	2015).	Women	certainly	exercise	choices	to	be	mothers	autonomous	of	genetic	fathers	or	partners,	but	nevertheless	are	constrained	by	many	material	and	ideological	factors,	including	the	law’s	apparent	desire	to	‘find	fathers’	for	children.	Interviews	revealed	that	‘single	mothers	by	choice’	typically	plan	carefully	prior	to	raising	a	child	and	rely	on	support	networks	of	various	forms,	thus	refuting	any	notion	that	their	‘autonomous’	mothering	is	conducted	in	splendid	isolation.	The	study	also	revealed	class	aspects	of	the	‘choice’	to	be	a	single	mother.	A	woman	who	responsibly	marshals	the	resources	to	be	self-sufficient	as	a	mother	will	be	viewed	more	positively	than	one	who	relies	on	social	assistance.	The	first	woman	is	also	more	likely	to	be	able	to	negotiate	the	laws	that	surround	legal	parentage.	Finally,	an	excessive	focus	on	choice	can	ultimately	divert	attention	from	the	goals	of	feminism,	including	the	transformation	of	the	conditions	under	which	parenting	takes	place.	
	
	
Social	&	Legal	Studies		
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Smart’s	influential	article	‘The	Woman	of	Legal	Discourse’	published	in	the	very	first	issue	of	SLS	(1992)	explained	how	legal	discourse	creates	a	particular	idea	of	‘Woman’	and	argued	that	law	is	a	site	of	struggle.	This	article	reflected	an	effort	to	rejig	feminist	legal	theory,	taking	account	of	postmodernist	approaches	that	rejected	‘second	wave’	socialist	and	radical	feminist	theories	(Conaghan	2013).	The	inaugural	issue	also	included	an	article	by	Dutch	feminist	political	theorist	Selma	Sevenhuijsen	(1992),	examining	law’s	discursive	effects	in	relation	to	the	reconfiguring	of	the	legal	treatment	of	motherhood	and	fatherhood	and	the	importance	of	looking	at	the	specific	historical	context	of	feminist	claims.	This	focus	on	the	legal	regulation	of	motherhood	and	reproduction	was	followed	up	in	later	issues	(e.g.	Belcher	2000,	Diduck	1993,	Fegan	1996,	2002;	Sheldon	1996,	Boyd	1996,	Hacker	2005,	Chunn	&	Gavigan	2004,	Lttichau	2004).		Several	important	feminist	legal	theorists	published	in	SLS	in	the	1990s,	asking	‘big’	questions	about	the	field.		A	few	offered	a	nascent	intersectionality	analysis.	Nicola	Lacey	(1992)	offered	an	important	critique	of	the	limits	of	liberalism,	theories	of	justice,	and	the	deeply	entrenched	gendered	(and	racialized	and	classed)	nature	of	the	welfare	state	and	the	public/private	divide.	Very	much	a	product	of	the	times,	the	work	of	Scandinavian	feminists	on	‘women’s	law’,	reflecting	feminist	standpoint	epistemology,	appeared	(Petersen	1992).		‘Women’s	law’	highlighted	the	innovative	challenges	of	feminist	legal	analyses	that	refused	‘to	start	out	with	preconceived	legal	concepts	from	above’	(Widerberg,	and	Hellum,	1993:	372)	and	instead	began	with	women’s	life	experiences	to	better	understand	their	actual	legal	situation	(see	also	Graycar	and	Morgan	1990).	Petersen’s	inquiry	(1992)	led	her	to	focus	on	informal	as	well	as	formal	law,	an	approach	she	suggested	was	consistent	with	postmodernist	legal	theory.	Australian	Margaret	Davies	ambitiously	grappled	with	the	problem	of	how	women’s	knowledge	is	made	the	object	of	property,	and	then	‘patronized,	abstracted,	defended,	and	subjected	to	rigid	limitations’	(1994:	366),	later	extending	her	property	analysis	to	queer	theory	and	praxis	(1999).		Early	SLS	issues	also	offered	important	debates	on	‘rights	discourse’	and	the	merits	of	engaging	in	litigation	rooted	in	equality	or	human	rights	(Fudge	and	Glasbeek	1992;	Thornton	1993),	acknowledging	feminist	work	in	this	field	and	flagging	the	role	of	new	social	movements	such	as	lesbian	and	gay	struggles	for	rights	(Herman	1993).	Gotell	(1995)	used	a	case	study	of	the	early	years	of	Canada’s	Women’s	Legal	Education	and	Action	Fund	to	show	how	translating	feminist	claims	into	rights	discourse	can	reproduce	an	‘essential	woman’	and	erase	the	difference	that	race	and	class	make	in	women’s	lives.	Lacey	(1996)	highlighted	feminist	critiques	of	both	rights	and	equality	discourses	as	well	as	the	risks	of	reformism,	but	considered	the	potential	for	reimagining	these	concepts.	In	so	doing,	she	echoed	a	point	made	in	the	first	SLS	editorial	(1992),	the	importance	of	integrating	theoretical	insights	(e.g.	from	critical	legal	theory	and	the	sociology	of	law)	with	socio-legal	research.	Lacey	noted	the	Marxist	insight	that	‘the	deep	reconstruction	of	the	legal	has	to	be	premised	on	the	reconstruction	of	economic,	social,	political	relations:	on	massive	changes	in	the	configuration	of	social	power	at	every	level’	(1996:	151).	Asking	whether	law	is	irretrievably	male,	and	offering	critiques	of	that	notion,	an	early	work	by	Ahmed	asked	whether	rights	necessarily	occupy	a	masculine,	liberal	discourse	or	whether	they	can	be	mobilized	and	embodied	differently	to	become	‘a	site	and	signifier	within	a	radical	feminist	politics’	(1993:	57).	Ahmed	proposed	a	deconstructive	and	pragmatic	feminist	approach,	suggesting	that	a	feminist	politics	of	law	requires	a	necessarily	pragmatic	ability	‘to	differentiate	between	specific	citational	practices	according	to	the	effects	they	may	elicit	on	subject	formations’	(63).		
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Over	time,	the	focus	on	‘big’	questions	about	feminist	legal	theory	seemed	to	fade	in	favour	of	strategic	feminist	engagement	with	particular	legal	issues.	SLS	also	published	important	interventions		illustrating	the	innovation	and	importance	of	feminist	methods	(e.g.	Adjin-Tettey	et	al	2008).	Angela	Harris	(1999)	emphasized	the	need	for	intellectual	communities	such	as	critical	race	theory	to	avoid	the	problems	of	identity	politics	and	attend	to	‘private’	or	process	issues	such	as	caretaking	that	are	traditionally	viewed	as	‘women’s	work’.		A	serious	consideration	of	intersectionality	of	race,	gender	and	sexuality	as	well	as	strength	in	diversity	and	coalition	building	is	required.	Increasingly	occupying	space	were	topics	that	traditionally	had	received	less	attention,	such	as	religion,	gender	and	culture	(Bakht	2015;	Vakulenko	2007),	trafficking,	migration,	and	citizenship	(Askola	2012;	Wilton	2009),	transitional	justice	(e.g.	McEvoy	and	McConnachie	2013;	Sankey	2015),	sex	work	(e.g.	Fizgerrald	and	McGarry	2016),	and	transgender	identity	and	experience	(Cowan	2009;	Sharpe	1997,	1999,	2007).	These	and	other	topics	require	attention	to	intersectionality	of	oppressions.		Questions	of	longstanding	feminist	interest	also	maintained	a	clear	presence	in	SLS,	including	sexual	violence,	the	regulation	of	marriage	and	relationships	(Thomson	2009),	motherhood	(e.g.	Gregory	2010),	and	women	in	the	legal	profession	(e.g.	Rackley	2006).	Even	authors	who	do	not	examine	issues	such	as	marriage	through	an	explicitly	feminist	lens	often	reference	feminist	scholarship	and	offer	complementary	critical	analyses	(e.g.	McGowan	2016;	Osterlund	2009).	Despite	Sheldon’s	concern	in	1996	that	abortion	was	slipping	off	feminist	agendas	(1996:	90),	a	recent	special	issue	of	SLS	edited	by	Mullally	and	Murray	(2016)	featured	feminist	work	on	rights	discourse	in	the	abortion	context	and	assessed	how	rights	gained	may	play	out	unevenly	or	problematically	in	practice.	The	regulation	of	reproduction	remained	a	focus	of	scholarship	(eg	Priaulx	2004;	Toscano	2005).	Moreover,	building	on	feminist	insights,	contributions	to	scholarship	on	masculinity	and	male	(hetero)sexuality	have	appeared,	including	Collier’s	exploration	of	how	the	legal	institution	of	marriage	constructs	‘natural’	sexual	intercourse	(1992).	Collier	later	published	a	piece	focused	on	legal	conceptions	of	fatherhood	and	paternal	masculinity	(1995).	Scholars	such	as	Park	(2012),	Ballinger	(2007)	and	Gadd	(2002)	turned	attention	to	work	that	masculinities	do	in	legitimizing	sexual	violence.			The	use	of	law	to	regulate	sexual	conduct,	particularly	gendered	sexual	violence,	remains	a	prominent	area	of	inquiry	for	feminist	and	other	socio-legal	researchers.		Analysis	in	SLS	often	draws	on	substantial	empirical	work	(Larcombe	2016,	Ellison	&	Munro	2014,	Finch	and	Munro	2007,	Gunby,	Caroline	&	Beynon	2013),	including	mock	jury	research	and	the	reports	of	medical	examiners	in	rape	cases,	in	addition	to	doctrinal	and	theoretical	work.	The	writing	on	sexual	violence	includes	attention	to	long-standing	areas	of	feminist	interest	such	as	the	standard	of	consent	(Larcombe	2016,	Arstein-Kerslake	&	Flynn	2016,	Gunby,	Caroline	&	Beynon	2013,	Rees	2010),	but	also	male	rape	(Graham	2006),	asylum	decisions	(Baillot,	Cowan	&	Munro	2012),	and	politically	motivated	sexual	assault	in	Arab	Spring	protest	spaces	(Tadros	2016).		Numerous	examples	of	feminist	scholarship	in	SLS	consider	questions	of	legal	strategy	and	effective	(or	not)	reform	efforts	in	areas	such	as	domestic	violence	(Lewis	et	al	2001),	sex	work	and	trafficking	(Munro	2005),	labour	rights	for	sex	workers	(Cruz	2013),	intersexuality	and	the	right	to	bodily	integrity	(Ammaturo	2016),	technology-facilitated	sexual	violence	(Henry	&	Powell	2016),	sexual	assault	(Arstein-Kerslake	&	Flynn	2016),	and	forced	marriage	(Park	2006).			
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Reflecting	the	influence	of	gender	and	queer	theory,	and	the	questions	we	raised	earlier	about	‘women	or	gender’,	the	pages	of	SLS	include	several	articles	by	feminist	scholars	on	the	legal	regulation	of	gender	identity	and	trans	experience.	Lamble	(2009)	examines	the	legal	invisibility	of	lesbian	and	trans	bodies	in	the	Toronto	Women’s	Bathhouse	Raids,	Karaian	(2013)	problematizes	‘repronormativity’	by	considering	how	the	law	conceives	(or	not)	of	pregnant	trans	men,	and	Grabham	(2010)	considers	how	notions	of	time	and	permanence	figure	in	the	legal	recognition	and	regulation	of	people	who	are	transitioning.		A	trilogy	of	papers	(Sharpe	1997,	Sharpe	1999,	Sharpe	2009)	interrogate	judicial	attitudes,	regulatory	regimes,	and	legislative	changes	on	gender	recognition	and	trans	legal	subjects.			Interestingly,	extensive	feminist	treatments	of	choice,	constraint,	and	autonomy	do	not	appear	in	SLS.	Discussion	arises	most	often	in	research	on	forced	marriage	(Shariff	2012),	the	limits	of	women’s	ability	to	choose	in	relation	to	abortion	(Fegan	2002);	Jackson	2000),	and	trafficking	or	prostitution/sex	work	(Bradley	&	Szablewska	2016;	Doezema	2005;	Priaulx	2004).	As	well,	Gregory	(2010)	problematizes	choice	under	neo-liberalism	in	a	nuanced	discussion	of	mothers	who	engage	in	prenatal	drug-use,	especially	choice	exercised	by	women	marginalized	by	race	and	poverty,	to	limit	their	reproductive	capacity,	including	by	medical	sterilization.		For	instance,	a	drug-user’s	choice	may	be	‘constrained	by	the	very	possibility	that	their	(unborn)	child(ren)	may	be	taken	away	from	them’	should	they	fail	to	choose	to	limit	their	reproduction	(Gregory	2010:	58).	Finally,	in	discussing	medicalization	and	gender	recognition	legislation,	Cowan	(2009:	249)	points	to	problematic	consequences	that	may	arise	due	to	financial	constraints	on	‘choice’	to	pay	for	surgery.		Our	review	suggests	that	SLS	has	offered	many	important	contributions	to	feminist	legal	scholarship	but	has	not	fulfilled	its	lofty	goal	of	integrating	feminist	analyses	at	every	level	of	scholarship.	It	features	feminist	work	quite	consistently	and	some	male	authors	incorporate	feminist	insights	or	concepts	into	their	legal	research	(e.g.	Leckey	2011;	Keren-Paz	2005),	suggesting	some	degree	of	mainstreaming.	The	international	reach	of	SLS	is	also	notable,	moving	beyond	Europe	and	North	America	to	offer	articles	on	feminist	and	related	struggles	in	Africa	and	India,	among	other	formerly	colonized	regions	(e.g.	Kapur	1999;	Krishnadis	2007;	O’Rourke	1995;	Stewart	1995;	Rai	1995).	Too	many	articles	fail,	however,	to	incorporate	or	even	mention	feminist	approaches.	As	well,	over	time,	our	impression	is	that	the	journal	has	featured	fewer	articles	addressing	feminist	legal	theory	per	se,	as	opposed	to	feminist	analyses	of	particular	legal	issues	and	debates.	We	have	not	tested	empirically	whether	this	impression	would	apply	across	legal	publishing	venues	and,	indeed,	the	field	is	so	vast	that	it	would	be	difficult	to	do	so.	No	doubt	the	question	of	the	merits	of	a	movement	away	from	feminist	legal	theory	and	towards	feminism	as	a	strategic	methodology	would	generate	lively	debate.		
Into	the	Future	We	now	turn	to	efforts	to	revitalize	feminist	legal	theory	and	possible	directions	for	this	field.	Some	feminists	despair	that	due	to	the	impact	of	neo-liberalism	and	other	more	socially	conservative	forces,	resort	to	the	state	(and	law	as	a	key	state	tool)	to	assist	in	remedying	gender-based	inequalities	is	increasingly	futile	(e.g.	Bumiller	2008).	We	suggest,	however,	that	feminist	legal	theory	remains	vibrant	and	that	its	diversity	points	to	new	possibilities	and	avenues	for	critique	and	social	change.	As	Painter	points	out,	the	‘problem-driven	impetus	of	feminist	legal	theory	contributes	to	its	present-day	heterogeneity’	(Painter	2015,	918).	Over	the	past	three	decades,	feminist	legal	scholars	have	tackled	more	diverse	legal	fields,	including	those	that	do	not	at	first	glance	involve	gender,	such	as	environmental	law	(e.g.	Scott	2016).	
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We	anticipate	that	feminist	legal	theory	for	the	future	will	draw	upon	various	theoretical	tools	that	have	been	offered	by	feminists	over	time,	including	those	in	the	materialist	tradition,	those	from	the	deconstructionst	or	postmodernist	tradition,	and	those	from	critical	race	and	intersectionality	theory.	Harris	(2016)	recently	offered	a	critical	analysis	of	the	rise	of	‘therapy	culture’	(which	promisingly	brings	a	feminist	‘different	voice’	of	empathy,	caring	and	relationship	into	public	spheres)	and	its	tendency	to	ignore	institutional	and	structural	inequalities	and	power	differentials.	Rather	than	stop	at	critique,	Harris	calls	for	feminist	engagement	with	therapy	culture	in	order	to	render	these	problems	visible.	Her	example	shows	that	feminist	work	is	important	in	fields	that	might	not	take	female	subjects	as	their	focus	(132).	Harris’s	article	draws	on	different	strands	of	feminist	theory,	including	difference	feminism	as	well	as	materialist	strands	that	point	to	the	brutal	impact	of	neo-liberalism,	especially	on	poor	and	racialized	communities,	and	the	need	to	restructure	the	state	itself	in	order	to	realize	a	transformative	version	of	justice	(Fineman	2010).			Materialist	feminist	approaches	indeed	appear	to	be	making	somewhat	of	a	comeback	in	feminist	legal	theory,	even	in	the	United	States	where	feminist	legal	scholars	rarely	took	them	seriously.	Cynthia	Grant	Bowman	recently	presented	a	powerful	argument	for	‘recovering	socialism’	for	feminist	legal	theory	in	the	21st	century	(Bowman	2016),	as	has	Maxine	Eichner	(2016).	Bowman	revisited	socialist	feminist	literature	and	made	a	plea	for	recovering	its	insights	for	feminist	legal	theory.	She	suggested	that	an	emphasis	on	the	incompatability	of	capitalism	with	full	human	flourishing,	especially	for	women,	as	well	as	on	the	importance	of	economic	forces	(both	production	and	reproduction)	as	essential	explanatory	tools	would	be	fruitful	and	would	usefully	guide	strategic	choices	for	women	looking	to	law	as	a	remedy.		She	notes	that	socialist	feminism	generally	acknowledged	the	interrelated	nature	of	race,	sex,	and	class,	and	so	would	be	consistent	with	an	analysis	that	took	seriously	the	need	for	alliances	between	different	groups	(2016:	165-166).		Socialist	feminist	insights	about	the	fundamental	relationship	between	the	sexual	division	of	labour	and	the	limits	of	law	reforms	emanating	from	liberal	feminist	law	reforms	to	both	public	(e.g.	employment	law)	and	private	spheres	(e.g.	family	law)	still	resonate.	Both	second	wave	socialist	and	radical	feminist	theories	were	highly	critical	of	marriage	and	the	heterosexual	nuclear	family	form	for	its	oppressive	enclosure	of	women	(see	Barker	2012:	129-144).	Because	capitalism	relies	upon	patriarchal	family	arrangements,	a	symbiotic	relationship	exists	between	the	two	systems	(Bowman	2016:	141);	as	such	challenges	to	the	sexual	division	of	labour	and	to	the	privatization	of	the	costs	of	social	reproduction	threaten	the	existing	economic	system.	In	recent	decades,	the	privatization	of	responsibility	for	care	and	dependency	within	the	family	actually	increased,	coincident	with	the	rise	of	neoliberalism	and	neoconservatism	(Barker	2012:	131).	Women	thus	experience	difficult	contradictions	in	their	lives,	with	heavy	demands	made	upon	them	in	the	public	sphere	of	employment	as	well	as	in	the	private	sphere	of	family.	These	contradictions	point	both	to	the	limits	of	law	reforms	to	date,	which	tinker	with	family	law	rules	on	compensation	through	property	and	support	law	and	make	promises	of	‘work-family	balance’,	and	to	the	radical	potential	of	challenging	taken-for-granted	arrangements	related	to	the	sexual	division	of	labour.	Therein	lies	some	hope	for	future	action.		Critical	reflection	on	attempts	to	engage	with	the	state	also	features	prominently	in	the	feminist	literature	on	violence	against	women	and	resort	to	the	criminal	law,	discussed	earlier.	Feminist	scholars,	particularly	racialized	scholars,	have	called	for	new	ways	of	responding	to	harm	and	victimization	that	understand	incidents	of	personal	violence	in	a	larger	context	of	structural	violence	(Harris	2011).	This	kind	of	transformative	justice	differs	
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from	conventional	criminal	justice	responses	that	are	rooted	in	liberal	notions	of	punishment	and	individual	responsibility,	as	well	as	from	alternative	restorative	justice	models	that	feminists	have	critiqued	as	particularly	inappropriate	to	address	sexual	and	intimate	partner	violence	(Daly	&	Stubbs	2006;	Cameron	2006).	Calls	for	transformative	justice	‘place	anti-subordination	at	the	centre’	of	responses	to	harm	and	reject	an	uncritical	reliance	on	state	institutions,	as	well	as	institutions	of	civil	society,	including	the	family	and	‘the	community’	(Harris	2011,	58),	both	of	which	have	been	the	location	of	oppression	for	women.			Crucially,	calls	for	state	action	must	go	beyond	calls	for	law	reform.	As	Basu	(2015)	concludes	in	her	study	on	marriage	in	India,	law	forms	only	a	small,	if	influential,	piece	of	the	major	rearrangement	needed	to	transform	structural	problems	such	as	the	gendered	dependency	of	marriage,	the	labour	market,	and	familial	transmission	of	property	and	other	resources.	Feminist	legal	strategies	could	benefit	from	considering	the	limits	on	legal	change	in	this	context:	what	strategic	engagement	with	law	might	be	useful	and	what	requires	more	systemic	change?			Feminist	voices	calling	for	a	return	to	materialist	analysis	stress	strategies	deriving	from	collective	action	and	collective	(rather	than	individual	or	private)	responsibility	for	all	in	society	in	order	to	combat	oppression.	This	approach	might	provide	an	avenue,	potentially,	to	move	beyond	differences	based	on	identity,	keeping	in	mind	the	insights	of	postmodern	and	intersectional	analysis.	While	some	focus	on	differences	(e.g.	between	women	and	men)	might	be	needed	to	ground	claims	about	oppression	and	to	consider	remedies	in	an	unequal	world,	a	focus	on	collective	responsibility	could	empower	all,	across	differences.			
Conclusion		Our	review	leads	us	to	differ	from	those	who	observe	that	few	feminist	legal	scholars	in	academia	now	devote	time	to	activism,	advocacy	or	practice	(Bartlett	2012,	429),	thus	diminishing	the	dialectical	relationship	between	scholarship	and	practice.	As	we	have	seen,	‘feminist	legal	thought	is	often	“applied”	theory	because	it	uses	theory	to	critique	a	practical	area	of	activity’	(Davies	2007:	651-652).	For	instance,	feminist	legal	theory	has	been	used	to	rewrite	judicial	decisions	from	a	feminist	perspective	(Majury	2006,	Hunter	et	al	2010,	Enright	et	al	2017).	Another	example	is	that	intersectionality	theory	has	been	employed	to	subject	the	operations	of	Royal	Commissions	to	critical	analysis	for	their	failure	to	take	appropriate	account	of	racism	and	the	experiences	of	racialized	women	(e.g.	Marchetti	2008).	Moreover,	at	least	in	the	Canadian	context,	many	(perhaps	most)	feminist	legal	scholars	are	engaged	in	some	activist	or	legal	advocacy	work,	although	the	pressures	of	academia	may	restrict	these	efforts.			One	recent	example	is	the	attention	to	issues	of	sexual	harassment	and	sexual	assault	on	university	campuses	and	the	involvement	of	feminist	legal	scholars	in	institutional	or	activist	responses	to	it.	In	Canada,	many	prominent	feminist	legal	scholars	have	played	leadership	roles	in	leading	institutional	responses	to	sexual	assault	on	campus,	pushing	for	more	fundamental,	survivor-focused,	change.		With	respect	to	sexual	harassment,	prominent	feminist	scholar	Sara	Ahmed	resigned	her	position	as	Director	of	the	Centre	for	Feminist	Research	at	Goldsmiths	University	due	to	the	university’s	failure	to	meaningfully	address	instances	of	sexual	harassment	that	she	and	others,	including	many	students,	had	been	raising	for	some	time.	Ahmed’s	recent	book,	Living	a	Feminist	Life	(2017),	and	her	blog	feministkilljoys.com,	provide	important,	current	examples	of	feminist	praxis.	The	figure	of	the	
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feminist	killjoy	reclaims	the	stereotype	of	humourless	feminist,	calling	out	sexism,	racism,	and	other	forms	of	injustice,	while	being	committed	to	building	a	better,	less	oppressive	world.			Conaghan	(2013)	links	any	gap	between	theory	and	activism	to	a	divide	between	the	discursive	and	the	material,	and	argues	for	attention	to	the	relation	between	the	world	and	our	knowledge	of	it	(47).	In	so	doing,	she	emphasizes	‘the	need	to	resist	conceptualizations	of	feminist	legal	engagement	as	either	material	or	discursive,	modern	or	postmodern,	reform-based	or	theoretical’	as	the	outcomes	of	legal	engagements	will	be	shaped	by	both	language	and	reality.	We	endorse	this	sentiment	and	urge	that	legal	scholars	of	the	future	draw	on	useful	tools	from	the	extensive	history	of	feminist	thought	and	on	the	urgency	felt	by	many	activists	for	pragmatic	engagement	with	fields	that	generate	oppression	or	that	offer	a	path	forward.			Recalling	the	words	and	the	work	of	Carol	Smart,	we	suggest	that	feminist	legal	scholars	and	the	journals	that	publish	their	work	recall	the	importance	of	empirical,	theoretical	and	historical	scholarship,	sometimes	done	separately	and	sometimes	integrated	(Smart	1999:	391).	As	Maureen	Cain	has	suggested,	once	we	have	deconstructed	the	ways	in	which	law	too	often	disempowers	its	would-be	users,	we	must	turn	to	the	possibilities	for	reconstruction,	requiring	‘a	relational	politics,	of	people	coming	together	to	develop	their	arguments,	find	channels	for	the	dissemination	of	their	ideas,	decide	how	best	to	influence	others’	(Cain	2002:	383).			Franke	has	observed	that	‘we	disagree	badly	as	feminists’	(2003,	641).	We	may	overly	police	the	boundaries	of	our	field,	particularly	as	feminist	legal	scholarship	has	grown	and	become	a	discipline	in	its	own	right;	or	we	may	take	disagreements	too	personally.	This	is	partly	because	the	personal	is	indeed	the	political	and	we	are	deeply	invested	in	the	work	we	do.	But,	as	Ahmed	(2017)	writes,	feminism	is	a	way	of	life,	a	movement,	a	world-building	project.	We	will	get	our	hands	dirty	and	we	will	be	bruised	along	the	way.	Brooks	(2015)	has	observed	that	‘[f]eminism	is	not	something	you	put	on	or	try	out	like	a	coat	or	something	you	look	through	like	a	window	or	a	pair	of	glasses.	It	is	a	dream’	(208).	Feminist	legal	scholarship	is	strongest	when	we	are	able	to	talk	across	differences	in	analysis	and	strategy	and,	yes,	to	dream	a	better	world.	Working	on	this	article	together	and	coming,	as	we	do,	from	different	generations	of	feminist	legal	scholars,	prompted	us	to	talk	through	differences	and	to	find	a	way	to	discuss	them.	Academic	publishing	can	play	a	role	in	facilitating	dialogues	across	differences	as	well	as	generations,	and	we	look	forward	to	many	more	years	of	SLS	providing	such	a	venue.				
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